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 GM food technology abroad and its implications for
Australia and New Zealand (ANZ)
Abstract
The potential economic benefits from agricultural biotechnology adoption by ANZ
need to be weighed against any likely loss of market access abroad for crops that may
contain genetically modified (GM) organisms. This paper uses the global GTAP model to
estimate effects of other countries’ GM policies without and with ANZ farmers adopting
GM varieties of various grains and oilseeds. The benefits to ANZ from adopting GM crops
under a variety of scenarios are positive even in the presence of the ban on imports from
GM-adopting countries by the EU (but not if East Asia also applied such a ban). GM food technology abroad and its implications for
Australia and New Zealand
1.  Introduction
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have great potential for the world’s farmers
and ultimately consumers. Benefits for farmers include greater productivity and less
occupational health and environmental damage (e.g., fewer pesticides), while benefits to
consumers include lower food prices and, potentially, enhanced attributes (e.g.,
‘nutriceuticals’). Despite those potential benefits, GMOs are attracting a high degree of
attention among some consumer and community groups concerned about their potentially
adverse impacts on food safety (e.g., ‘Will they cause cancer?’) and the environment (e.g.,
‘Will they lead to pesticide-resistant superweeds?). Numerous governments are responding
to those concerns, typically in very conservative, command-and-control ways such as
banning the production and/or use of products containing GMOs or, in cases where
permission is granted to grow or sell certain GM crop varieties, mandating strict GMO
labelling laws that necessitate expensive segregation and identity preservation systems to be
used throughout the supply chain.
Exporters of food products fear that they will find customers in food-importing
countries discounting or refusing to buy their products if even a subset of their country’s
farmers adopt GM technology. Indeed the European Union has had a moratorium – in place
since October 1998 – on the approval of GM crop varieties for domestic production or
importation. As a result, the US share of the EU’s maize imports has fallen to virtually zero
(from around two-thirds in the mid-1990s), as has Canada’s share of EU canola imports2
(from 54 per cent in the mid-1990s). So while these GM-adopting countries have benefited
in terms of lower production costs,
1 they have lost market share to GM-free suppliers,
including Australia in the case of canola.
Food-exporting countries such as Australia and New Zealand (hereafter ANZ) thus
need to weigh the potential economic benefits from biotechnology development against any
negative environmental risks associated with producing GM crops, any additional costs of
segregation and identity preservation through the supply chain to allow consumers to choose
between foods with and without GMOs, any discounting and/or loss of market access abroad
for conventional counterparts to those specific crops which may contain GMOs, and any
discounting and/or loss of market access abroad for other farm products because of what GM
adoption does for ANZ’s generic reputation as a ‘clean, green’ and ‘safe food’ producer.
2 
Yet even before that analysis could be done, health ministers in Australia and New
Zealand introduced strict regulations concerning GMOs. As from mid-2001, Food Standards
Australia New Zealand requires that GM foods cannot be supplied to the domestic market
unless approved (20 had been approved as at August 2001), and mandatory labelling is
required for all approved GM foods including processing aids (but not animal feeds) that
contain GM protein or DNA or have altered characteristics.
3 This is one of the most rigorous
food safety regimes in the world outside the EU, which means that satisfying domestic sales
requirements makes it possible for ANZ exporters to satisfy most other countries’
requirements (even though different labels will be required for different markets). On the
production side there are strict controls too. As at end-2003, Australia had approved GM
production only of cotton and carnations and, like New Zealand, key State governments have
moratoria on GM food crop production in their jurisdiction.
To date there has been very little empirical analysis of the benefits and costs of GMO
policies abroad or at home to ANZ crop and livestock producers and the economy generally.3
Partial equilibrium studies have been undertaken by Foster (2001) for canola and wheat in
Australia and by Saunders and Cagatay (2003) for four products in New Zealand, and Stone
et al. (2002) provide a general equilibrium analysis (using the global GTAP model) for
coarse grains and oilseeds in Australia. The present study goes beyond those earlier studies
in several respects: among other things, it uses the same general equilibrium GTAP model as
Stone et al. but a more recent version of the GTAP database and examines a wider range of
GM adopting countries and of policy responses; it examines not just coarse grains and
oilseeds but also prospective GM versions of wheat and rice; it examines within the same
modelling framework the effects on both Australia and New Zealand without and then with
them adopting GM crop varieties; and it looks at effects on not only national economic
welfare but also the real net income of farm households in both countries (as distinct from
the partial equilibrium notions of producer welfare).
The next section of the paper provides details of the GTAP model of the global
economy used to explore production, trade, price and national economic welfare effects.
Results are presented in Section 3 for a range of scenarios that vary by types of GM crops, the
set of adopting countries and various policy responses to GM technologies. Key caveats are
discussed in Section 4 before drawing out policy implications for Australia and New Zealand
in the final section. 
2.  The GTAP model and modifications
The well-received Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model of the global
economy is used to provide insights into the effects of GMO technology adoption in some
countries without and then with policy responses in other countries. Version 5.4 of the
GTAP database, released in late 2003, is used for these applications. It draws on global4
economic structures and trade flows of 1997. The GTAP model has been aggregated to
depict the global economy as having 17 regions (to highlight the main participants in the
GM debate), and 14 sectors (with the focus on the primary agricultural sectors affected by
the GM debate and their related processing industries).
4 Building on a recent Productivity
Commission study (Stone et al. 2002), our modification of the GTAP model captures the
effects of productivity increases of GM crops, consumer aversion to consuming GM
products and substitutability of GM and non-GM products as intermediate inputs into final
consumable food. 
2.1  Production
In the GTAP simulations reported below we assume 45 per cent of US and Canadian
coarse grain production is GM while Latin American countries, Australia and New Zealand,
if they adopt, are assumed to adopt GM coarse grains at two-thirds the level of the US (i.e.
30 per cent of coarse grain production is GM) and all other countries are assumed to adopt
GM coarse grains at one-third the level of US adoption (i.e. 15 per cent of coarse grain
production is GM). We also assume that 75 per cent of oilseed production in the US,
Argentina and Brazil is GM, while Canada, other Latin American countries, Australia and
New Zealand adopt at two-thirds the extent of the major adopters and the remaining regions
adopt at one-third the extent of the major adopters. For rice, major prospective adopters
including the US, Canada, China, India, and all other Asian countries are assumed to
produce 45 per cent of their crop using GM technologies. All other regions are assumed to
adopt at two-thirds this rate (i.e. 30 per cent of rice crop is GM). GM wheat adoption is
assumed to occur to the same extent as coarse grain adoption for all regions. These base-case
assumptions synthesize estimates from a variety of sources including European Commission
(2001) and James (2003).5
To distinguish GM from non-GM productivity, the adopting sectors are each sub-
divided into GM and non-GM product, and an output-augmenting, Hicks-neutral
productivity shock is implemented on the GM varieties of these commodities to capture their
higher productivity. Following Stone et al. (2002), these model simulations assume that total
factor productivity is higher for GM than for non-GM varieties by 6 per cent for oilseeds and
7.5 per cent for coarse grains; in the prospective cases of rice and wheat, a 5 per cent
difference is assumed. This assumes that GM technology uniformly reduces the level of
primary factors needed per unit of output.
5 In the constant-elasticity-of-substitution
production nest, producers choose first between imported and domestic inputs according to
the model’s Armington (1969) elasticities, and then choose whether or not to use GM or
non-GM intermediate inputs in their production of final goods. 
Some earlier studies have assumed GM adoption requires the introduction of
segregation and identity preservation systems, and have suggested they could amount to as
much as 15 per cent of the farm gate price of the GM product (e.g., Burton et al. 2002). But
in practice such costs may be borne partly by producers of non-GM varieties, and the fixed
cost of their introduction would be amortised. We expect in the steady state that the annual
cost would be very small, bearing in mind that segregation and identity preservation are not
new and are becoming more common as consumers demand ever-greater product
differentiation by variety, by quality and (for various food safety and environmental reasons)
by place and method of production. For those reasons, and because in our policy response
simulations we assume countries banning GM supplies exclude imports from GM-adopting
countries of both the GM varieties and GM-free substitutes, we do not include segregation
and identity preservation costs.
2.2  Consumption6
Consumer knowledge and acceptance of GM foods varies around the world (Gaskell
et al. 1999, MacGarry et al. 2002; James and Burton 2003). In order to capture consumer
aversion to GM products, two changes are made to the traditional GTAP demand structure.
First, elasticities of substitution between GM and non-GM varieties of each product in
regions where consumers are GM-averse are set at low levels to capture the perceived low
degree of substitutability. In addition, preference shift parameters are included to capture the
group of consumers in some countries that, because of food safety and/or environmental
concerns, refuses to consume GM crops regardless of their price. In such cases a 25 per cent
reduction in final demand for imported crops that may contain GMOs is assumed, following
Nielsen and Anderson (2001) and Stone et al. (2002).
2.3  Simulations
The simulations reported below are selected to show how different combinations of
crop choice, country adoption and policy responses alter economic impacts of GM
technologies. Three sets of crop adoption scenarios are considered. 
The first set of simulations examines the implications of adoption of GM coarse
grains and oilseeds by the US, Canada and Argentina without and with ANZ also adopting,
and without and with an EU moratorium. These scenarios are then compared with all
countries of the world adopting GM varieties of these crops, to get an idea of the economic
benefits foregone because of the reluctance in the EU and elsewhere to embrace this new
technology (Simulations 1a to 1e). 
The second set of simulations recognises that GM varieties are being developed for
the world’s other two major food crops, rice and wheat, and that they are almost ready for
release should governments choose to approve them and consumers be willing to buy
products that include them. This set examines the impact of adding GM rice and wheat7
adoption in the US, Canada, Argentina to their adoption of coarse grains and oilseeds,
together with China and India also adopting GM varieties of all four groups of crops. As
with the first set of simulations there are five scenarios in this set too: adoption without and
with ANZ also adopting, and without and with an EU moratorium, plus one with all
countries of the world adopting GM varieties of these crops (Simulations 2a to 2e).
 The third set of simulations recognises that the EU moratorium has prompted other
countries to adopt a similar approach to GM food products. Sri Lanka, for example, has
imposed a ban on imports of all food containing GMOs. More importantly for global food
markets and poverty alleviation, China has not approved production of GM food crops other
than tomatoes and peppers, and it imposed a ban on imports of GM food products in 2001
following a UK government ban on imports of soy sauce from China because it may have
been produced using GM soybeans imported by China from the US. (That ban was
somewhat relaxed in 2002 following intense lobbying pressure from US farm groups.) In the
third set of simulations we examine the impact of GM adoption of coarse grains and oilseeds
in just North America and Argentina in the presence of a GM import moratorium by not only
the EU but also China and other two key Northeast Asian countries (Japan and South
Korea), first without and then with ANZ adopting GM varieties of those crops. This pair of
scenarios highlights the tradeoff for ANZ producers and governments between productivity
growth via GM adoption and the benefits of remaining GM-free given EU and (assumed)
Northeast Asian reluctance to import crops produced in GM-adopting countries
(Simulations 3a and 3b). 
3.  Model results
3.1 Volume and price effects8
To examine the impacts of these various adoption patterns on ANZ agricultural
sectors, Table 1 reports the production, price and trade impacts of US, Canada, and
Argentina adopting GM varieties of coarse grains and oilseeds without and with the EU
moratorium, alongside the same scenarios but with ANZ also adopting those GM varieties
(columns 1 and 2 versus 3 and 4).
6 If Australia chooses not to adopt GM varieties, and all
countries treat GM and GM-free varieties as like products, its production and net exports of
not only coarse grains and oilseeds but also of meat (and other livestock) products fall,
because domestic prices of these products are lowered by the greater competition resulting
from the technology shock in the Americas (column 1 of Table 1). The same is true for New
Zealand, although with smaller orders of magnitude (shown in parentheses in Table 1). The
EU, however, has banned imports of most coarse grain and oilseeds from North America and
Argentina because of their GM content, providing greater opportunities for ANZ and other
food exporters to supply European markets. That reduces the extent of the reduction in
Australian production and net exports of these products but it does not eliminate the negative
effect of greater competition from GM adopters abroad. Even for New Zealand it barely is
sufficient to neutralize the production effect of GM adoption abroad (column 2 of Table 1).
7                                                                                                                                                                                                              
If ANZ were to choose to join the GM adopters, Australian coarse grain production
would expand instead of contracting and, if there were no EU moratorium, oilseeds
production would fall much less. Lower domestic prices for these products induce increases
in domestic consumption but those increases would not be enough to prevent coarse grain
net export earnings from rising instead of falling (compare columns 1 and 3 of Table 1).
Oilseeds net exports would fall less in the absence of an EU moratorium but not in its
presence, should Australia adopt GM varieties not approved in the EU (see second-last row
of Table 1). 9
3.2 National trade balance and net welfare effects
The effect on the aggregate trade balance is positive for ANZ in the absence of the
EU moratorium and negative in its presence, in line with the sign of the net impact of the
productivity growth and policy response on the global economy. The reduction in that trade
balance from adopting GM coarse grain and oilseed varieties would be no more than US$2
million per year for Australia and less than $0.5 million for New Zealand, without or with
the EU moratorium (compare columns 1 and 3 or 2 and 4 of the first two rows of Table 2). 
The net economic welfare effects on ANZ and other countries for these scenarios are
summarized in the lower part of Table 2. GM coarse grain and oilseed adoption by North
America and Argentina benefits those countries despite the deterioration in their terms of
trade, although less so (especially for Canada) in the case where the EU moratorium
continues. The EU and the rest of the world also would benefit, via improved terms of trade,
except in the case of the EU moratorium which raises EU domestic prices of farm products
and thereby attracts more resources into an already heavily protected EU farm sector.
Australia is worse off if it does not adopt but better off if it does, the difference for these
commodities being (10 – (-4) =) US$14 million per year in the presence of the EU
moratorium but (7 – (-9) =) US$16 million if the moratorium were to be removed. New
Zealand too is better off by adopting, by $1-2 million per year. GM adoption by these
countries (with or without ANZ adopting) would benefit the world as a whole by a
substantial US$2.3 billion per year if the EU were to impose no barriers to imports of GM
products. This represents more than half of the gains that would come from the whole world
adopting GM varieties of these products ($4.0 billion – see final column and row of Table
2), reflecting (a) the fact that the adopters produce close to half the world’s coarse grain and
oilseed and (b) our assumption that the broadacre nature of production/large farms in the10
adopting countries ensures GM crops would represent a larger proportion of production there
than in the rest of the world.
In the second set of simulations, wheat and rice are added to the set of GM crops and
China and India are included in the set of GM-adopting countries. That lowers ANZ
production, prices and net exports of coarse grain and oilseeds even more than in the first set
of simulations (because of greater competition from wheat and rice), in addition to having
negative effects on ANZ wheat and rice markets. The net economic welfare effects of adding
these commodities and countries to the crop adoption set are dramatic. Global economic
welfare improves, if there are no trade policy responses, by $4.3 billion instead of $2.3
billion per year (compare column 1 in Tables 2 and 3). The US, Canada and Argentina gain
little extra, however, because their productivity gains are almost offset by a worsening of
their terms of trade as a consequence of their additional productivity and of extra global
supplies following China and India’s adoption. When ANZ don’t adopt GM varieties,
Australia loses around twice as much in this extended adoption scenario regardless of the EU
policy stance while New Zealand loses almost no more (since it produces almost no wheat
and rice). If ANZ adopt GM varieties of coarse grains, oilseeds, rice and wheat, Australian
economic welfare would improve more than in the coarse grain/oilseed adoption scenario in
the absence of the EU moratorium, while New Zealand’s would be no different (compare
columns 3 in Tables 2 and 3). 
In the presence of the EU moratorium, on the other hand, Australia’s welfare would
improve less than in the coarse grain/oilseed adoption scenario (but still improve) while New
Zealand’s would improve more (compare columns 4 in Tables 2 and 3). The reason for the
difference between Australia and New Zealand in that latter comparison is because of the
lowered price of wheat and rice in international markets, which alters the terms of trade
negatively for Australia but slightly positively for New Zealand. In other words, Australia11
would gain from joining the adopters of GM varieties of these four crops even if the EU
moratorium were to continue indefinitely, provided the value Australians place on any
adverse environmental effects of GM production (net of any positive environmental effects
such as reduced pesticide use) is no more than US$7 per capita per year (assuming total
annual benefits are spread equally among Australia’s population). For New Zealand,
however, that figure is less than 50 US cents per capita.
The above results understate the impact of current EU policies on ANZ and other
countries because the EU moratorium has encouraged the adoption of GM trade restrictions
in other countries. What would be the impact if Northeast Asian countries were to follow the
policy example of the EU? This can be seen from Table 4, which shows results from our
third set of simulations in which the EU moratorium on trade in GM coarse grains and
oilseeds is extended to include China, Japan and Korea. That broadening of the moratorium
alters somewhat the incentives for Australia, but not New Zealand, to adopt GM varieties
(first two rows of Table 4). Specifically, row 11 of Table 5 (Sim 3a) shows that the positive
terms of trade impact Australia experiences by not adopting GM varieties and thereby
maintaining market access to these important markets ($111 million) dominates the negative
allocative efficiency impact (-$15 million), resulting in a net positive welfare outcome (US$
96 million). If Australia chooses to adopt and thereby loses access to both European and
Northeast Asian markets, on the other hand (Sim 3b), the negative terms of trade impact (-
$46 million) overshadows the potential benefits from technical change ($17 million) and
improved allocative efficiency ($16 million) to yield a net loss of $13 million per year (row
12 of Table 5).
8 The difference for Australia in this case between Sims 3a and 3b (that is,
between adopting and not adopting in the presence of a broadened moratorium) is thus $109
million per year. (One-fifth of that difference is due to China, the rest to Japan and Korea.)12
For New Zealand, by contrast, its coarse grain and oilseed industries are too small for GM
adoption there to make much difference (compare the final two rows of Table 5). 
In short, the payoff to ANZ from GM adoption is positive in the first two sets of
scenarios (the second involving GM adoption by two more large countries and two more
crops than is currently the case),
9 but if the EU does not effectively remove its moratorium,
that gain to ANZ is smaller. Moreover, if the EU’s stance were to encourage Northeast Asia
also to adopt a moratorium on imports from GM-adopting countries, the payoff to ANZ from
adopting could switch to slightly negative. 
3.3 Real net farm household income effects
These net national welfare gains are the sum of the effects for food producers and
consumers, assuming no externalities on the production side and no food safety concerns on
the consumption side of the market. What are the effects on just farm household incomes in
ANZ? To estimate them, we assume ANZ farm households earn 75 per cent of their net
income from farm activities (half from labour, one-eighth from land and the rest from
physical capital) and the other 25 per cent from non-farm activities (one-third from wages
and two-thirds as returns to physical capital). With those earnings shares and the changes in
factor prices generated by the GTAP model we can estimate the changes in net earnings of
farm households. To convert them to changes in real net income we assume ANZ farm
households have the same spending pattern as the community average and so we subtract the
change in the consumer price index. The resulting estimates are shown in the final column of
Table 5.
In no cases are these effects more than 1 per cent. This result is not surprising because
these crops contribute only a small fraction of net incomes of farm households in Australia
and even less in New Zealand. Also, the terms of trade changes from GM adoption abroad13
are only small; and in the cases of adoption at home, the assumed productivity growth is just
5 to 7.5 per cent and is applied to only 30 per cent of production of coarse grain, wheat and
rice and 50 per cent of oilseeds. Even so, the results suggest ANZ farmers would be slightly
worse off from adopting versus not adopting GM crops, implying that ANZ non-farm
households would need to compensate farmers out of their gains from the fall in food prices
if ANZ farmers were to be end up no worse off from embracing this technology.
10 The
difference is especially marked in the case where Northeast Asia copies the EU moratorium:
in that scenario, Australian farm households would be 0.8 per cent better off if they do not
adopt GM coarse grain and oilseed varieties but 1 per cent worse off if they do (rows 11 and
12 of Table 5). 
4. Caveats
The myriad assumptions that are necessary to run the above simulation experiments
make the inclusion of systematic sensitivity analysis impractical in a journal-length paper.
But several key assumptions should be kept in mind. In all these simulations, we assume for
simplicity that there are no negative environmental risks net of positive environmental
benefits associated with producing GM crops, and that there is no discounting and/or loss of
market access abroad for other food products because of what GM adoption does for a
country’s generic reputation as a producer of ‘clean, green, safe food’.
11 
We also assumed that there is no need for segregation and identity preservation (SIP)
through the supply chain to allow consumers to choose between foods with and without
GMOs, since in our scenarios countries where consumers are assumed to care ban all
imports of affected crop products from GM-adopting countries. On the one hand, that
assumption means we may have overstated the welfare cost of the moratoria for GM-14
adopting countries unless SIP costs would be prohibitively expensive.
12 On the other hand, it
also means we have overstated the gains to ANZ from GM adoption at home because, given
the strict labelling legislation introduced by both countries earlier this decade, a SIP system
for domestic crops would have to be introduced if GM varieties were to be grown locally.
Third, we have ignored the owners of intellectual property in GM varieties, and
simply assumed the productivity advantage of GM varieties is net of the higher cost of GM
seeds. In so far as that intellectual property is held by a firm in a country other than the GM-
adopting country, then the gain from adoption is slightly overstated in the adopting country
(and understated for the home countries of the relevant multinational biotech companies).
Fourth, the effects of adoption and of policy responses depend on, among other
things, the elasticities of substitution in consumption between GM and GM-free (but
otherwise like) products. This is unlikely to be important, however: a recent study explored
this issue explicitly and found that results did not vary much as those elasticities were altered
(Anderson et al. 2002).
Fifth, our technology shocks assume a uniform increase in productivity of all factors
used in GM crop production. It makes little difference to the results when that assumption is
changed to allow some factors to be saved more than others; but we have underestimated the
shock in so far as we have not also assumed productivity growth in the use of some
intermediate inputs such as pesticides.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the above comparative static modelling
assumes GM technology delivers just a one-off increase in total factor productivity (TFP) for
that portion of a crop’s area planted to the GM varieties. But what is more likely is that, once
the principle of GM crop production is accepted, there would be an increase in the rate of
agricultural TFP growth into the future, so that the present value of future returns from GM
adoption may be several times the numbers shown above.15
5.  What should Australia and New Zealand do?
The comparative advantages of Australia and New Zealand in various (GM and non-
GM) crops will continue to change not only because of changing consumer attitudes at home
and abroad but also as ANZ’s trading partners alter their consumer, producer and trade
policies and as new GM crop varieties appear. Currently plenty of markets for GM crops
exist, as the three first GM-adopting countries – the US, Canada and Argentina – account for
high shares of global exports even including intra-EU trade (80 per cent for maize, 64 per
cent for soybean and 42 per cent for canola in 2002). Where price premiums for non-GM
varieties exist they are small, meaning that the market for certified traditional non-GM foods
may become in the long run just a niche market similar to that for organic products
(Mendenhall and Evenson 2002). In the short to medium term, however, ANZ’s benefits
from adoption depend on the extent to which GM products are accepted by ANZ’s current
major trading partners.
One aspect of the debate that requires further research is the impact of the cost and
distributional consequences of national segregation and identity preservation (SIP) systems
that will be needed to supply markets with strict GM labelling laws (including the EU and
ANZ). Recent debates over whether to approve GM canola production in Australia illustrate
that production is unlikely to be approved until a cost-effective SIP system is in place to
allow co-existence of non-GM and GM varieties (Parliament of South Australia 2003).
Several States of Australia, like New Zealand, continue to delay approval because they
perceive insufficient economic benefit from GM crops to warrant the cost of the necessary
co-existence system (which will fall more on non-GM producers, the smaller the share of16
GM varieties in total output) and the expected loss that would result from a downgrading of
their region’s status as a ‘clean, green, safe food’ supplier domestically and abroad. 
These cautious approaches were understandable while only maize and soybean were
ready for adoption, while consumer aversion remained high, and where SIP systems were
undeveloped. However, a ban on GM production will be less defensible as and when these
conditions change. GM yield-increasing varieties of canola suitable for Australian conditions
are now available and two herbicide-resistant ones have been approved by the Office of the
Gene Technology Regulator, and new wheat varieties have also been developed by CSIRO
that are drought tolerant and exhibit high tolerance to some common pests (CSIRO 2003).
Prospective environmental costs are increasingly being weighed against possible
environmental benefits from the switch to GM varieties instead of those possible costs being
viewed in isolation.  Also, consumers are showing more tolerance of GMOs where labelling
laws are in place, particularly as they learn of the prospects for building in attributes desired
for health, etc. reasons. And SIP systems are gradually becoming more common and cost-
effective in response to consumers seeking ever-more product information in general on
food labels.
Even if the gains today from GM adoption by ANZ farmers may seem small, as
suggested by the above results, it needs to be kept in mind that maintaining GM-free status
will likely lead to a bias toward more-traditional research that will tend to be slower and
hence less rewarding. Apart from farmers, that could be costly to ANZ consumers, as well as
to ANZ’s biotechnology industry which is a potential export earner in its own right. Indeed
the longer domestic governments restrict GM crop production, the more ANZ scientists will
tend to migrate to more-stimulating research environments abroad. For all these reasons, and
given the time lags between R&D investment and farmer adoption of innovations, it would
be prudent for ANZ rural R&D agencies to ensure a portion of their portfolio includes the17
development of GM technologies appropriate to local conditions so that, when markets
become more accepting, those technologies can be produced and disseminated relatively
promptly. 18
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Table 1:  Australian (and New Zealand)
a production, price and trade impacts, under various GM adoption
and policy response scenarios
(percentage changes, weighted average of GM and GM-free varieties)











Sim 1a Sim 1b Sim 1c Sim 1d
Production volume
Coarse grains -0.2 (-0.2) -0.1 (0.0) 0.4  0.2
Oilseeds -3.2 (-0.6) -2.3 (0.2) -0.8 -3.7
Meat products -0.1 (-0.2) -0.1 (0.0) -0.1 -0.1
Domestic market prices
Coarse grains -0.1 (-0.0) -0.1 (-0.0) -1.2 -1.2
Oilseeds -0.1 (-0.0) -0.1 (-0.0) -1.0 -1.0
Meat products -0.0 (-0.0) -0.1 (-0.0) -0.1 -0.1
Import volume
Coarse grains 7.0 (2.2) 8.0 (2.8) -4.5 -3.7
Oilseeds 6.7 (1.9) 8.1 (0.9) 2.7 3.8
Meat products 0.4 (0.7) 0.3 (1.3) 0.3 0.2
Export volume
Coarse grains -1.0 (-0.9) -0.8 (18.8) 2.0 0.7
Oilseeds -4.6 (-4.1) -3.3 (23.7) -1.1 -6.0
Meat products -0.3 (-0.4) -0.3 (4.3) -0.3 -0.2
a New Zealand percentage changes are shown in parentheses
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.23
Table 2: Trade balance and economic welfare effects of GM coarse grain and oilseed adoption by various
countries
                            (US$ million per year)
















Sim 1a Sim 1b Sim 1c Sim 1d Sim 1e
Change in trade balance
 Australia 8 -3 6 -5 5




Australia -9 -4 7 10 2
New Zealand -5 2 -3 3 -5
Argentina 312 247 312 247 287
Canada 72 7 72 7 65
US  939 628 939 627 897
EU-15 267 -3145 270 -3160 595
Rest of World 714 1029 730 1041 2207
WORLD 2290 -1243 2325 -1226 4047
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results24
Table 3: Trade balance and economic welfare effects of GM coarse grain, oilseed, rice and wheat
adoption by various countries
(equivalent variation in income, US$ million)
US, CAN, ARG, China
and India adopt
US, CAN, ARG, China and

















Sim 2a Sim 2b Sim 2c Sim 2d Sim 2e
Change in trade balance
 Australia 11 -1 6 -4 6




Australia -18 -10 10 5 -1
New Zealand -6 2 -3 6 -7
Argentina 350 285 350 285 312
Canada 83 -23 82 -25 63
US  1045 754 1047 756 1041
China 841 833 851 842 899
India 669 654 671 656 669
EU-15 355 -4717 363 -4868 810
Rest of World 989 1330 1027 1376 3719
WORLD 4308 -892 4398 -968 7506
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results25
Table 4: Economic welfare effects of GM coarse grain and oilseed adoption by the US, Canada and
Argentina with EU and Northeast Asian moratoria




 plus ANZ adopt
Sim 3a Sim 3b
Australia 96 -13
New Zealand 14 16
Argentina 213 214
Canada -84 -81
US  427 431
EU-15 -3080 -3164
China -971 -1323
Japan and Korea -2552 -2645
Other Asia 117 143
Rest of World 1348 1444
WORLD -4471 -4977
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results26
Table 5:  Decomposition of national economic welfare effects and change in real farm household income
due to GM adoption under various simulations
a
(equivalent variation in income, US$ million)
















       Australia
Sim 1a 2 -11 0 -9 -0.05
Sim1b 3 -6 0 -4 -0.02
Sim 1c 3 -16 20 7 -0.10
Sim 1d 5 -14 19 10 -0.11
Sim 1e 5 -22 19 2 -0.35
Sim 2a 4 -22 0 -18 -0.07
Sim 2b 6 -15 0 -10 -0.04
Sim 2c 4 -38 44 10 -0.12
Sim 2d 10 -48 43 5 -0.16
Sim 2e 8 -51 43 -1 -0.17
Sim 3a -15 111 0 96 0.83
Sim 3b 16 -46 17 -13 -0.99
       New Zealand
Sim 1a 0 -3 0 -5 -0.05
Sim1b 0 1 0 2 0.01
Sim 1c 0 -5 2 -3 -0.10
Sim 1d 0 1 2 3 -0.07
Sim 1e 0 -7 2 -5 -0.35
Sim 2a 0 -6 0 -6 -0.02
Sim 2b 0 2 0 2 0.01
Sim 2c 0 -6 4 -3 -0.11
Sim 2d 1 1 4 6 -0.08
Sim 2e 0 -10 4 -7 -0.18
Sim 3a 2 12 0 14 0.07
Sim 3b 1 14 2 16 -0.01
a See the previous three tables for the descriptions of each of the simulations. The welfare decomposition
follows Harrison, Horridge and Pearson (1999).
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results27
                                                                                                                                                                            
1 The adoption of GM technology has been most widespread in the production of maize, soybean
and canola (key livestock feed ingredients globally), as well as cotton. As of 2002, GM varieties
accounted for one-quarter of the area planted to those crops globally (and 4.3 per cent of all arable
land), having been close to zero prior to 1996. But most of them are grown in Argentina, Canada
and the United States, where that GM share is more than 60 per cent (James 2003).
2 Australia and New Zealand also have a stake in the current and possible future WTO dispute
settlement cases on GMOs, bearing in mind the risks this issue brings to the rules-based global
trading system in general and the WTO’s farm trade reform agenda in particular. These WTO
issues are not discussed in this paper but are in Anderson and Nielsen (2001). See also Shendon
and Josling (2002) and Isaac and Kerr (2003).
3  Excluded from that definition are highly refined foods, processing aids (such as enzymes used
in cheese and brewing) and additives that lost their GM protein or DNA during processing, food
prepared by restaurants and takeaways for immediate consumption, GM flavourings up to 0.1 per
cent by weight, and foods, ingredients or processing aids that have GMOs present unintentionally
up to no more than 1 per cent by weight per ingredient.
4 The GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model is a multi-regional, static, applied general
equilibrium model based on neo-classical microeconomic theory with international trade
described by an Armington (1969) specification (which means that products are differentiated by
country of origin). See Hertel (1997) for comprehensive model documentation and Dimaranan
and McDougall (2002) for the GTAP 5.4 database used here. The model is solved with
GEMPACK software (Harrison and Pearson 1996). Welfare decomposition follows Harrison,
Horridge and Pearson (1999).
5 Because it makes little difference to the results being analysed here, we simply follow previous
analysts in assuming that the productivity effects of genetic modification do not differ across
crops or inputs (Nielsen and Anderson (2001), Anderson, Nielsen and Robinson (2002)). For28
                                                                                                                                                                            
studies that differentiate the degrees of factor/input saving, see Huang et al. (2002) and Van Meijl
and van Tongeren (2002).
6 Separate simulations of first Australia and then New Zealand adopting showed that each country
is too small in global food markets to significantly affect the other’s production, trade and
welfare, so we only report their combined adoption in simulations 1c and 1d (and 2c, 2d and 3b,
below).
7 The positive trade effect is very small in dollar terms because it is from a tiny base.
8 The larger loss for China in this scenario is because Australia would be a major supplier of
coarse grain imports by China if Northeast Asia were to cease buying from North America, but
that trade ceases in the scenario in which ANZ adopts GM varieties.
9 These results, and those in the sub-section to follow, are not dissimilar to those from earlier
partial equilibrium studies (Foster 2001, Saunders and Cagatay 2003) and a more-limited CGE
study by Stone et al. (2002).
10 Australian consumers do this implicitly already through taxpayer matching of farmer R&D
levies that jointly fund Australia’s rural research and development corporations.
11 If Australia were to allow GM adoption then the demand for food products in general from New
Zealand may increase at Australia’s expense in so far as the two countries are currently seen as
close alternative suppliers of ‘clean, green safe food’.
12 Whether in fact we have overstated the welfare cost of the moratoria for GM-adopting countries
depends also on the extent (if any) to which GM adoption for some crops has reduced sales
revenue from other crops because of tainting the GM-adopting country’s generic ‘clean, green,
safe food’ image.